The US navy’s commitment to the new Trump-class battleships has blown out the cost of its new fleet by billions of dollars, a report to the US Congress has found, as the acting secretary of the navy conceded this week the Iran war was “stretching” the fleet’s capacity.
The challenges facing the world’s biggest naval force were highlighted this week, when the return of the USS George Washington from the Middle East on Wednesday ended a rare three-month period when the US had no aircraft carrier across all of the Pacific. Deployments have been regularly running beyond 300 days, with the maintenance and repair of ships deferred so they can stay at sea longer.
Outpaced in shipbuilding by China, the US navy wants to increase its fleet from 286 battle force ships to 381 over the next 30 years.
But the congressional budget office’s analysis of the navy’s 2027 shipbuilding plan states the navy’s projections have underestimated the costs of its new fleet by billions because some ships’ designs have proven more complicated than expected, and the “estimated costs of some ships were unrealistically low in earlier shipbuilding plans”.
Total shipbuilding costs would average $54bn annually (in 2026 dollars) over the next 30 years, the CBO found, about 18% more than navy estimates.
“Much of the additional costs in the 2027 plan stem from the navy’s decision to purchase 15 large, heavily armed battleships, which would concentrate firepower in a few large ships and thus would be at odds with the navy’s stated goal of distributing it among a greater number of ships or vessels.”
The 15 new battleships are the proposed “Trump-class” warships, which the president has said will be 100-times more powerful than any previous warship in a US fleet, and will “inspire fear in America’s enemies all over the world”. Senate appropriators this week proposed cutting to zero the $1bn the navy sought in advanced procurement this fiscal year for the Trump-class ships.
On Wednesday, the acting secretary of the navy, Hung Cao, conceded before a Senate confirmation hearing that the Iran war was “stretching” the fleet’s capacity.
“This war, again, I know it’s a strain on our navy,” he told senators.
His term as acting secretary – he requires a special waiver to be permanently appointed because of his recent active service – was criticised by Democratic senators. “The world is less safe as a result of the Iran war,” Richard Blumenthal told Cao.
“We’ve seen costs soar, lives lost, casualties. Our relationships with allies deteriorate as a result of this war. In fact, the navy has been stretched beyond sustainable limits under your watch, and the fleet is in worse condition than it was when you took office along with this president.”
The conflict in Iran is estimated to have cost the US $260bn, Michigan senator Elissa Slotkin told the committee hearing.
“Yet we do not have the same freedom of navigation that we had a year ago.”
For all of the effort and resourcing of the world’s most powerful bluewater navy to keep the strait of Hormuz open, passage across the contested waters remains at barely more than a third of pre-war levels.
Shipping traffic remains approximately 65% below the rate before the US and Israel launched strikes on Iran on 28 February, according to the latest weekly report from the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations.
A year ago, the cost to insure a commercial ship for a single passage through the Strait of Hormuz was $54,000, Cao told the Senate: “Today it’s $64m just to get across.”
The additional cost of every passage is borne by consumers all around the world, in higher prices for fuel, fertilizer, and food.
US navy ships are also consistently running longer and longer deployments. Since the start of the Iran war, ships have been deployed for 10 to 11 months, far beyond the standard seven months, and sailors have been told to expect extended deployments will remain standard for a number of years.
Several ships have spent beyond 300 days on deployment since the war began. The USS Abraham Lincoln went 265 days at sea, the longest a navy ship has gone without visiting a port.
Challenged about a “mental health crisis” onboard the Lincoln, Cao insisted eight reported suicide attempts on board were instead “suicide mitigations”.
He dismissed concerns that sailors onboard US ships were going hungry. In response to testimony before the Senate committee that one sailor had reported losing 45lbs (20.4kg) in six months on deployment “because of a lack of food”, Cao put it down to fussiness, likening it to “my kids opening up the refrigerator door and saying: there’s nothing to eat in here”.
For only the second time in two decades, the US navy had no aircraft carrier group in the Pacific between August and November. The Washington has returned to to the control of the US Pacific fleet “conducting routine operations” in the Asia-Pacific region.
Prof Kevin Rowlands, journal editor at the Royal United Services Institute, told the Guardian the “overstretch” facing the US navy was “critical but manageable – for now”.
He said: “The real problems will arise further down the line if the war continues. Every long deployment will have a knock on effect for maintenance and people in future.”
Naval planners work on a broad ‘rule of threes’: to have a single platform permanently available for deployment, a navy needs three.
“When one ship is deployed, another is preparing and training to replace it, and another is in maintenance, recovering having just come back. Effectively you need at least three to maintain one on station permanently. So, when something ‘new’ comes along, such as the war against Iran, it affects planning and allocation everywhere else.”
The US has, for decades, enjoyed an unrivalled naval pre-eminence, able to project power across the world. But China is rapidly catching up. US naval intelligence estimates China’s overall shipbuilding capacity is roughly 232 times greater than that of the US. Chinese shipyards delivered more than twice the naval tonnage as US yards across 2024 and 2025, according to the World Defense Shipbuilding report.
US allies, such as the nations of the first island chain off the Chinese mainland, and Pacific allies such as Australia “will always want US ships to be available in their region”.
“But, in return, the US would like its allies to share some of the burden it currently carries… the projection of naval power becomes a diplomatic negotiation, especially when the US sees the world through a transactional lens.”
“With Aukus, and the commitments to the Indo-Pacific, and commitments to Nato, and now the Middle East, the US can just about manage but there is zero spare capacity. That’s why one thing going wrong has negative impact everywhere. That, in essence, is the overstretch.”

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